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NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff and Respondent Stan Katz, requests that this 
Court affirm a final order of the trial court denying Appellant's 
Motion to Set Aside Default and Default Judqment entered on the 
26th day of Auqust, 1985 in the Third Judicial District Court in 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issues presented by this appeal are as follows: 
1. Whether the refusal of the trial court to grant 
Defendants' Motion to Set Aside Default and Default Judgment 
constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
2. Whether Appellants may raise for the first time on 
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appeal evidentiary matters not raised before the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff's Complaint seeking recovery of installment 
contract arrearages under a Uniform Real Estate Contract plus 
court costs and attorney's fees was filed on March 14, 1985. 
(R2) 
Defendants Allwin W. Pierce and Vennadel Pierce were 
served with Summons and Complaint on March 30, 1985. (R7, RIO) 
The Summons provided for thirty days in which to answer, because 
two of the Defendants, Kent S. Larson and Ruby Larson, resided out 
of the state. 
Defendants Allwin W. Pierce and Vennadel Pierce delivered 
the Summons and Complaint to their counsel, Andrew B. Berry, Jr., 
on April 15, 19R5. (R33) 
Despite several telephone conversations between counsel 
prior to and through April 17, 1985, defense counsel Andrew Berry 
never requested any extension of the time in which to file an 
Answer. (R40) 
By letter dated April 22, 1985 (R43), received by 
Defendant's counsel on April 23, 1985 (R33), Plaintiff's counsel 
informed Defendant's counsel that an Entry of Default and Default 
Judgment would be submitted if no Answer was filed by April 20, 
1985. (R43) 
The Entry of Default was actually submitted on Aoril 30, 
-2-
1985f and executed the same day (R13), 31 days from the date of 
service upon Defendants. 
Plaintiff's Default Judqment was submitted and executed on 
May 17, 1985 (R16, R17). 
Defendant's Answer was finally filed on May 30, 1985 
(R18), 55 days after the Complaint was delivered by Defendants to 
their counsel, 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In circumstances where: 
a. no request for an extension of time in which to 
file and answer is made, and 
b. counsel is told in writing that a default will be 
taken unless an answer is filed before a date 
certain, and 
c. no Answer is filed within the statutory time 
period, or within the extended time period 
(thirty days) stated in the Summons, 
it is not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to refuse to 
set aside the default and default judqment. 
Where the Appellant elects not to rely on a transcript of 
the lower court proceedings, there is a presumption that 
sufficient evidence was introduced to sustain the judqment. More 
important, the Appellant is not entitled to raise for the first 
time on appeal matters not raised before the trial court. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE REFUSAL OF THE TRIAL COURT TO SET ASIDE THE 
DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION REQUIRING REVERSAL BY THIS COURT. 
It was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to 
refuse to set aside the Default and Default Judgment under the 
factual circumstances present here. 
No substantial disoute exists as to the chronology of 
events which led to the entry of Default and Default Judqment 
against Defendants Allwin W. Pierce and Vennadel Pierce. The 
Pierces were served the Summons and Complaint on March 30f 1985. 
Because the two remaining Defendants, Kent S. Larson and Ruby 
Larson resided out of the state, the Summons provided for 30 days 
in which to answer. (R7, RIO) The Pierces delivered the Summons 
and Complaint to their counsel, Andrew B. Berry, Jr., on April 5, 
1985. (R33) 
Despite several telephone conversations between Andrew 
Berry and Raymond Scott Berry, counsel for Plaintiff, Defendant's 
counsel never requested any extension of the time in which to file 
an Answer. (R40) 
By letter dated April 22, 1985, (R43), counsel for 
Plaintiff informed counsel for the Defendants that an Entry of 
Default and Default Judqment would be entered if an Answer was not 
filed by April 20, 1985. (R43) 
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The Entry of Default was actually not submitted until 
April 30, 1985. Tt was executed by the court the same day. (R13) 
On April 30, 1985, 31 days had elapsed from the date of service 
upon Defendants Pierces. 
The Default Judgment was not submitted and executed until 
May 17, 1985 (R16, R17). 
The Answer of Defendants was finally filed on May 30, 1985 
(R18), 55 days after the Complaint was delivered by the Pierces to 
their counsel. 
Subsequently within the time specified bv URCP 60(b), 
Defendant filed a Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment, citing 
URCP 55(c) and 60(b). The Motion to Set Aside the Default and 
Default Judgment states that the default "judgment previously 
entered should be set aside "on the qround that counsel for each 
of the parties were engaged in negotiation." (R36) 
Motions for relief under URCP 60(b) mav not be granted 
unless specific factual showings are made. Specifically, under 
URCP 60(b)(1), there must be a showing of "mistake, inadvertance, 
surprise, or excusable neglect?". 
The question then becomes whether the "negotiations" 
referred to by Defendants in their Motion to Set Aside the Default 
constitute mistake, inadvertance, surprise, or excusable neglect. 
Counsel for Appellant has cited no authority in support of 
the proposition that negotiations, if actually occurring, are 
grounds for relief under URCP 60(b). More to the point, the 
-5-
communications referred to as "negotiations" by counsel for 
Appelants could be eaually well described as discussions. In 
their respective Affidavits filed in support of and in opposition 
to the Motion to Set Aside the Default, counsel characterized 
those communications differently. Presumably, it is within the 
discretion of the trial court to determine which characterization 
was the most accurate. The exercise of discretion is not 
synonymous with an abuse of discretion, as Appellants seem to 
maintain. 
The law in this -jurisdiction relatinq to the standard of 
review on the refusal of a trial court to set aside a default 
judgment is well settled. The recent case of Airkem 
Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P.2d 429 (1973), 
contains the most recent succinct expression of that standard. In 
that opinion, this court states: 
For thi's court to overturn the discretion of 
the lower court in refusinq to vacate a valid 
judgment, the requirements of public policy demand 
more than a mere statement that a person did not 
have his day in court when full opportunity for a 
fair hearing was afforded to him or his legal 
representative. The movant must show that he used 
due diligence and that he was precluded from 
appearing by circumstances over which he had no 
control. (Citation omitted, emphasis in original) 
In denying the Appellant's Motion to Set Aside the Default 
Judgment, the trial court in effect determined that Defendants 
have not used due diligence and that they were not prevented from 
appearing by circumstances over which they had no control. That 
conclusion is totally consistent with the factual chronology. 
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The undisputed history establishes that despite 
discussions between counsel, counsel for the Appellants never at 
any time reguested an extension of the time period in which to 
answer. (R40) Second, the record establishes that on April 22, 
1985, counsel for Defendants was informed in writing that a 
default would be taken unless an Answer was timely filed. (R43) 
Despite that warning, no Answer was filed, and on April 30, 1985, 
the default of the Defendants was actually submitted and entered. 
These undisputed facts persuaded the trial court that 
Defendants had not exercised due diligence, and that they were 
not prevented from appearing by circumstances over which they had 
no control, the test cited in Airkem Tntermountain, Inc. v. 
Parker. 
That conclusion is consistent with the previous ruling of 
this court set forth in Masters v. LeSeuer, 13 Utah 2d 293, 373 
P2d 573 (1962). In that action, after entry of a default judgment 
in favor of Plaintiff, the Defendant moved to set aside the 
default on the grounds of inadvertance and excusable neglect. The 
Motion was denied, and the Defendant appealed. 
The Affidavit filed in support of the Motion to Set Aside 
stated that the attorney for the Defendant thought he had filed an 
Answer but had mistakenly not done so. However, evidence 
presented by the Plaintiff in opposition to the Motion and 
accepted bv the trial court established that several days before 
the default judgment was reguested, the attorney then representing 
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the Plaintiff called Defendant's attorney to the fact that the 
matter was in default and that a default judgment would be taken 
unless somethinq was done. On those factors, the action of the 
trial court was sustained* 
The case presented here is similar in that seven days 
before the entry of default was submitted and entered, Plaintiff's 
counsel informed Defendant in writing that a default would be 
taken unless a timely Answer was filed. Under the circumstances, 
a substantial imaginative step would be required before it could 
reasonably be concluded that counsel for Appellants was misled or 
surprised by the submission and entry of the Default Certificate, 
In conclusion, Defendants failed before the trial court to 
make any showing of mistake, inadvertance, surprise or excusable 
neglect which would justify relief from the judgment actually 
entered, and the trial court so found. The trial court apparently 
was not persuaded that "negotiations" reasonably excused 
Defendants from their obligation to file a timely response, 
particularly when those "negotiations" did not involve any reguest 
for an extension of time in which to answer and where Defendant's 
counsel was warned in writing that a default would be taken if no 
timely Answer was filed. 
The decision of the trial court does not exhibit an abuse 
of discretion that would justify reversal. To the contrary, the 
trial court's decision exhibits an exercise of discretion 
consistent with the controlling principles adopted by this court 
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Under these circumstances, where there exists an 
unrebutted presumption that the judgment was supported by adequate 
evidence, and where the complaint regarding the failure to hold an 
evidentiary hearing is raised for the first time on appeal, it 
would be improper for this court to reverse the trial court's 
judgment on the grounds suggested by Defendants. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff resoectfully submits that the Entry of Judqment 
of which Defendants complain was done within the sound discretion 
of the trial court, consistent with the controlling law and basic 
considerations of fair play. Appellants have not cited any 
authority supporting their claim that "negotiations" toll the time 
period in which an Answer is reguired. Appellants have failed to 
offer any basis for a finding that they were prevented from filing 
a timely Answer by circumstances beyond their control. The 
decision of the trial court should be sustained. 
At the trial court level, Respondent was awarded costs and 
attorney's fees based on a contractual provision. On appeal, 
Respondent similarly requests that it be awarded its reasonable 
attorney's fees and costs incurred by this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this , >^ day of March, 1986. 
GREEN & BERRY 
t j Aw \_h^y 
Raymond Scott Berry /) 
Attorney for Plainti-if/Respondent 
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